LNG tanker port would impact island lifestyle

Other papers and units need to cover this story. The little Jamestown Press is out at the forefront here. And the danger of exposure to RI and Mass. residents is shocking!

Editorial, Jamestown Press, August 20, 2009

The U.S. Coast Guard recently approved, in concept, a proposal to build a liquefied natural gas offl oading terminal in the middle of Mt. Hope Bay.

This latest plan, put forth by Weavers Cove Energy, would have 145-ft. wide LNG supertankers navigating the East Passage of Narragansett Bay to Mt. Hope Bay. The massive tankers would dock in the middle of the bay and pump their super-cooled cargo 4.2 miles through underground insulated piping to storage tanks in Fall River, Mass.

The Coast Guard had rejected an earlier plan that required the supertankers to make hairpin turns as they traveled up the Taunton River to Fall River.

This latest proposal, which has received the Coast Guard’s blessing (with conditions), would allow LNG supertankers to cruise past Conanicut Island some 70 times a year – more than once a week. To provide security against a possible terrorist attack, the Coast Guard would escort each supertanker up the bay with a two-mile moving exclusion zone surrounding the vessel. Each shipment of the highly volatile fuel would require that Narragansett Bay be closed to all normal boating traffic. In addition, the Pell Newport Bridge and the Mt. Hope Bridge would be closed while the tankers passed beneath.

Narragansett Bay is the boating capital of New England. These supertankers would frequently disrupt sailing regattas in the summer months. Bridge closings would delay emergency ambulance trips across the Pell Bridge. There could be economic impacts, such as a decline in property values, as well.

Of course, these disadvantages pale in comparison to the danger posed by a LNG supertanker. It has been estimated that should a LNG tanker leak and explode, everyone within a three-mile radius would be killed.

There is still time to be heard. Other agencies must approve the plan and public hearings will be held. We’ll keep you informed. In the meantime, write to our U.S. senators and representatives. They need to know how you feel about these LNG supertankers sailing past your home more than once a week.

— Jeff McDonough

Defining LNG Hazards on the Narragansett Bay

Note from Greetings: This is a followup letter from another group dealing with LNG tankers in their area. It's quite sobering, as was the Jamestown Press's initial story, which I will rerun. I can not imagine why any of our lawmakers will allow this to happen, nor the Coast Guard, nor the DEP. To quote the letter below: "The Weaver's Cove Terminal would severely impact property values; it would also present serious hazards. 1/3 of a mile from the explosion.. everyone would die. 1 mile from the ship - 2nd degree burns and asphyxiation potential (all within the range of Jamestown, Newport, Middletown, Portsmouth, Bristol, Fall River, and other population centers); 2.2 miles still presents an asphyxiation hazard and potential explosion hazards. (Moving past the bay into the other RI population centers, such as North Kingstown, East Greenwich, into Massachusetts and further north.) So... WHY is this even an option?

Jamestown Press, Letters to the Editor, Aug, 27, 2009

I just read your Aug. 20 editorial, “LNG tanker port would impact island lifestyle,” and thought I should mention some misunderstandings regarding LNG hazards.

I agree with your assessment that the Weaver’s Cove LNG terminal would severely disrupt activities on the water and impact property values. It would also present serious hazards; however, the comprehensiveness of the hazard mentioned in the editorial, I believe, is considerable but overstated.

While FERC considers the hazard zones (“zones of concern”) to extend just 2.2 miles from LNG ships, Dr. Jerry Havens, who developed the vapor dispersion hazard model, believes 3 miles is probably more accurate. Havens also has indicated that FERC and LNG developers improperly calculate LNG vapor impact zones. However, the 2.2- or 3-mile hazard zone does not mean everyone within that zone would be killed. There are three hazard zones: 1) 500 meters/one-third of a mile from the ship, 2) 1,600 meters/1- mile from the ship, and 3) 3,500 meters/2.2 miles from the ship. The hazard impacts would lessen with the increased distances of each zone.

Zone 1 presents the greatest hazards, where everyone would likely be killed by cryogenic temperatures, fire, explosion or asphyxiation.

Zone 2 presents a 30-second second-degree burn hazard to unprotected skin from a pool fire due to a conflagrated release at the ship. Confined vapor explosions, fire and asphyxiation could occur if combustion did not occur concurrently with the LNG release.

Zone 3 presents an explosion hazard from confined vapors, burn and fire hazard, and possibly an asphyxiation hazard.

In addition, actual impacts would probably not be symmetrical and would not entirely fill the areas of each of the hazard zones. The LNG vapors would likely be driven by wind, so the impacts would occur in relation to the wind direction and topography.

Another issue that may interest you is that the Weaver’s Cove Energy site violates world LNG industry terminal siting best practices. The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO; www.SIGTTO. org) represents over 95 percent of the world’s LNG industry. They research and promulgate best practices. Their publication “Site Selection and Design for LNG Ports and Jetties” (available only in hard copy for around £30 via Witherby’s Seamanship International) clearly states that, for the health of the LNG industry, LNG terminals should not be sited where vapors from a large LNG release would affect civilian populations. They also state that LNG terminals should not be sited up long and winding inland waterways where navigation hazards are greater. Also, in another publication of best practices, they indicate terminals should not be sited where there are conflicting uses of the waterway – now and into the future. Weaver’s Cove Energy clearly violates these best practices (see my LNG Terminal Siting Standards Organization website: www.LNGTSS.org).

Unfortunately, the U.S. Coast Guard and FERC ignore SIGTTO. They justify this by stating SIGTTO is merely advice and not law. Paradoxically, the U.S. Coast Guard spends considerable energy advocating adherence to best practices when it comes to other navigation issues.

LNG-related zone terminology is frequently misunderstood. Exclusion zones refer exclusively to LNG terminals, and are intended to prevent burn/fire injury to civilians and civilian assets. LNG ships have moving safety and security zones intended to prevent LNG ships from colliding with other vessels and to prevent attack from other marine sources. Also, while it would seem to make sense that the three LNG ship hazard zones should protect the public equally as terminal exclusion zones, they are based on different parameters. Exclusion zones are much smaller than hazard zones. Exclusion zones are designed (generally) to prevent civilians from the impacts of an LNG release, while hazard zones are not prohibited from engulfi ng large civilian populations who could be killed or injured.

I hope this information is useful.
Robert Godfrey
Researcher and webmaster
Save Passamaquoddy Bay
3-Nation Alliance
Eastport, Maine