The Case Against Geithner

by Dylan Ratigan, Huffington Post

As we sit here today, Wall Street continues to exploit a policy of government-sponsored giveaways and secrecy to pay themselves billions.

Record-setting bonuses due to banks like Goldman Sachs as early next week.

Yet instead of acting as our cop, Secretary Tim Geithner has become central to what may be a cover-up of the greatest theft in U.S. history.

Here is the evidence.

COUNT 1: The AIG Emails:

Recently-released emails show Geithner's New York Federal Reserve Bank directing AIG to keep details of the 100-cents-on-the-dollar bailout secret in 2008 -- A reversal of the traditional role of government, which is to force companies to become more transparent, not less.

A Treasury Spokeswoman says: "Secretary Geithner played no role in these decisions and indeed, by November 24, he was recused from working on issues involving specific companies, including AIG."

Friday, the White House also defended the Treasury Secretary:

Gibbs: These decisions did not rise to his level at the fed.

CNN's Ed Henry: How do you know that he wasn't involved? He was the leader of the New York Fed.

Gibbs: Right, but he wasn't on the emails that have been talked about and wasn't party to the decision that was being made.

He wasn't party to a decision to hide $62 billion dollar payouts to firms that became insolvent during his 5-year watch at the New York Fed?

Congressman Darrell Issa speculates that maybe Geithner wasn't on the emails in question because his people felt so strongly they already knew their boss's intentions, they didn't feel the need to bother him with the details.

COUNT 2: He wasn't even a regulator!

In Geithner's own words during confirmation hearings in March:

"First of all, I've never been a regulator...I'm not a regulator."

According to the New York fed bank's website, that was your job!! And I quote from the Fed's website: "As part of our core mission, we supervise and regulate financial institutions in the Second District."

That district of course is the epicenter for bailed out banks and billion dollar bonuses.

Count 3: "The Christmas Eve Taxpayer Massacre."

As you were wrapping those last presents, Geithner's Treasury Department lifted the 400-billion dollar cap on taxpayer responsibility for potential losses for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

The new cap? Unlimited taxpayer funds! Interesting timing... Christmas eve, Tim?

Still no word on recovering the hundreds of millions paid to the CEOs who created this mess.

COUNT 4: He's too cozy with certain banks.

Remember those call logs when he first started... 80 contacts with Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and CitiGroup CEOs in just 7 months!

But Bank of America's CEO only got three calls. Apparently Bank of America is not one of Geithner's favorites, especially when you consider that there are still many unanswered questions about Tim Geithner's role in threatening to fire Bank of America management if they didn't go through with a deal to buy Merrill lynch.

COUNT 5: TARP Special Investigator Neil Barofsky's report says Geithner's New York Fed overpaid the big banks through AIG by billions of dollars.

Geithner says it had to be done. Maybe so, maybe not, but this takes us to our final point.

Since then, the Treasury Secretary has yet to really prove whose side he's on -- the Wall Street big wigs or the American taxpayer? Here's the litmus test: Mr. Geithner, show us the past ten years of AIG emails or step down so that we can get somebody who will. A crime has been committed against the American taxpayer and right now you are standing at the door of the crime scene refusing to let anyone in.

Show us you're not involved Mr. Geithner, prove the white house correct in defending you. All we are asking for is the transparency promised by the President you serve.

Follow Dylan Ratigan on Twitter: www.twitter.com/DylanRatigan

The Other Plot to Wreck America

By FRANK RICH, NY Times

Published: January 9, 2010

THERE may not be a person in America without a strong opinion about what coulda, shoulda been done to prevent the underwear bomber from boarding that Christmas flight to Detroit. In the years since 9/11, we’ve all become counterterrorists. But in the 16 months since that other calamity in downtown New York — the crash precipitated by the 9/15 failure of Lehman Brothers — most of us are still ignorant about what Warren Buffett called the “financial weapons of mass destruction” that wrecked our economy. Fluent as we are in Al Qaeda and body scanners, when it comes to synthetic C.D.O.’s and credit-default swaps, not so much.

What we don’t know will hurt us, and quite possibly on a more devastating scale than any Qaeda attack. Americans must be told the full story of how Wall Street gamed and inflated the housing bubble, made out like bandits, and then left millions of households in ruin. Without that reckoning, there will be no public clamor for serious reform of a financial system that was as cunningly breached as airline security at the Amsterdam airport. And without reform, another massive attack on our economic security is guaranteed. Now that it can count on government bailouts, Wall Street has more incentive than ever to pump up its risks — secure that it can keep the bonanzas while we get stuck with the losses.

The window for change is rapidly closing. Health care, Afghanistan and the terrorism panic may have exhausted Washington’s already limited capacity for heavy lifting, especially in an election year. The White House’s chief economic hand, Lawrence Summers, has repeatedly announced that “everybody agrees that the recession is over” — which is technically true from an economist’s perspective and certainly true on Wall Street, where bailed-out banks are reporting record profits and bonuses. The contrary voices of Americans who have lost pay, jobs, homes and savings are either patronized or drowned out entirely by a political system where the banking lobby rules in both parties and the revolving door between finance and government never stops spinning.

It’s against this backdrop that this week’s long-awaited initial public hearings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission are so critical. This is the bipartisan panel that Congress mandated last spring to investigate the still murky story of what happened in the meltdown. Phil Angelides, the former California treasurer who is the inquiry’s chairman, told me in interviews late last year that he has been busy deploying a tough investigative staff and will not allow the proceedings to devolve into a typical blue-ribbon Beltway exercise in toothless bloviation.

He wants to examine the financial sector’s “greed, stupidity, hubris and outright corruption” — from traders on the ground to the board room. “It’s important that we deliver new information,” he said. “We can’t just rehash what we’ve known to date.” He understands that if he fails to make news or to tell the story in a way that is comprehensible and compelling enough to arouse Americans to demand action, Wall Street and Washington will both keep moving on, unchallenged and unchastened.

Angelides gets it. But he has a tough act to follow: Ferdinand Pecora, the legendary prosecutor who served as chief counsel to the Senate committee that investigated the 1929 crash as F.D.R. took office. Pecora was a master of detail and drama. He riveted America even without the aid of television. His investigation led to indictments, jail sentences and, ultimately, key New Deal reforms — the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Glass-Steagall Act, designed to prevent the formation of banks too big to fail.

As it happened, a major Pecora target was the chief executive of National City Bank, the institution that would grow up to be Citigroup. Among other transgressions, National City had repackaged bad Latin American debt as new securities that it then sold to easily suckered investors during the frenzied 1920s boom. Once disaster struck, the bank’s executives helped themselves to millions of dollars in interest-free loans. Yet their own employees had to keep ponying up salary deductions for decimated National City stock purchased at a heady precrash price.

Trade bad Latin American debt for bad mortgage debt, and you have a partial portrait of Citigroup at the height of the housing bubble. The reckless Citi executives of our day may not have given themselves interest-free loans, but they often walked away with the short-term, illusionary profits while their employees were left with shredded jobs and 401(k)’s. Among those Citi executives was Robert Rubin, who, as the Clinton Treasury secretary, helped repeal the last vestiges of Glass-Steagall after years of Wall Street assault. Somewhere Pecora is turning in his grave

Rubin has never apologized, let alone been held accountable. But he’s hardly alone. Even after all the country has gone through, the titans who fueled the bubble are heedless. In last Sunday’s Times, Sandy Weill, the former chief executive who built Citigroup (and recruited Rubin to its ranks), gave a remarkable interview to Katrina Brooker blaming his own hand-picked successor, Charles Prince, for his bank’s implosion. Weill said he preferred to be remembered for his philanthropy. Good luck with that.

Among his causes is Carnegie Hall, where he is chairman of the board. To see how far American capitalism has fallen, contrast Weill with the giant who built Carnegie Hall. Not only is Andrew Carnegie remembered for far more epic and generous philanthropy than Weill’s — some 1,600 public libraries, just for starters — but also for creating a steel empire that actually helped build America’s industrial infrastructure in the late 19th century. At Citi, Weill built little more than a bloated gambling casino. As Paul Volcker, the regrettably powerless chairman of Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, said recently, there is not “one shred of neutral evidence” that any financial innovation of the past 20 years has led to economic growth. Citi, that “innovative” banking supermarket, destroyed far more wealth than Weill can or will ever give away.

Even now — despite its near-death experience, despite the departures of Weill, Prince and Rubin — Citi remains as imperious as it was before 9/15. Its current chairman, Richard Parsons, was one of three executives (along with Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs and John Mack of Morgan Stanley) who failed to show up at the mid-December White House meeting where President Obama implored bankers to increase lending. (The trio blamed fog for forcing them to participate by speakerphone, but the weather hadn’t grounded their peers or Amtrak.) Last week, ABC World News was also stiffed by Citi, which refused to answer questions about its latest round of outrageous credit card rate increases and instead e-mailed a statement blaming its customers for “not paying back their loans.” This from a bank that still owes taxpayers $25 billion of its $45 billion handout!

If Citi, among the most egregious of Wall Street reprobates, feels it can get away with business as usual, it’s because it fears no retribution. And it got more good news last week. Now that Chris Dodd is vacating the Senate, his chairmanship of the Banking Committee may fall next year to Tim Johnson of South Dakota, home to Citi’s credit card operation. Johnson was the only Senate Democrat to vote against Congress’s recent bill policing credit card abuses.

Though bad history shows every sign of repeating itself on Wall Street, it will take a near-miracle for Angelides to repeat Pecora’s triumph. Our zoo of financial skullduggery is far more complex, with many more moving pieces, than that of the 1920s. The new inquiry does have subpoena power, but its entire budget, a mere $8 million, doesn’t even match the lobbying expenditures for just three banks (Citi, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America) in the first nine months of 2009. The firms under scrutiny can pay for as many lawyers as they need to stall between now and Dec. 15, deadline day for the commission’s report.

More daunting still is the inquiry’s duty to reach into high places in the public sector as well as the private. The mystery of exactly what happened as TARP fell into place in the fateful fall of 2008 thickens by the day — especially the behind-closed-door machinations surrounding the government rescue of A.I.G. and its counterparties. Last week, a Republican congressman, Darrell Issa of California, released e-mail showing that officials at the New York Fed, then led by Timothy Geithner, pressured A.I.G. to delay disclosing to the S.E.C. and the public the details on the billions of bailout dollars it was funneling to its trading partners. In this backdoor rescue, taxpayers unknowingly awarded banks like Goldman 100 cents on the dollar for their bets on mortgage-backed securities.

Why was our money used to make these high-flying gamblers whole while ordinary Americans received no such beneficence? Nothing less than complete transparency will connect the dots. Among the big-name witnesses that the Angelides commission has called for next week is Goldman’s Blankfein. Geithner, Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke should be next.

If they all skate away yet again by deflecting blame or mouthing pro forma mea culpas, it will be a sign that this inquiry, like so many other promises of reform since 9/15, is likely to leave Wall Street’s status quo largely intact. That’s the ticking-bomb scenario that truly imperils us all.

A Squeeze on Credit Card Customers Ahead of New Rules

Note from Greetings: Check those card statements, folks... no matter how great your credit. Last minute antics by the credit card companies before the new laws come into effect.

By ANDREW MARTIN and LOWELL BERGMAN

Banks are struggling to make money in the credit card business these days, and consumers are paying the price. Interest rates are going up, credit lines are being cut and a variety of new fees are being imposed on even the best cardholders.

One recipient of new credit card terms is Anita Holaday, a 91-year-old in Florida, who received a letter last month from Citibank announcing that her new interest rate was 29.99 percent, an increase of 10 percentage points.

“I think it’s outrageous they pursue such a policy,” said Susan Holaday Schumacher, Ms. Holaday’s daughter, who pays her mother’s bills. “That rate is shocking under any circumstances.”

While the average interest rates charged by banks are lower than Ms. Holaday’s, her situation is not all that unusual. The higher rates and fees reflect the grim new realities of the credit card industry — the percentage of uncollectible balances has hit a record even as a new law may further limit the cards’ profitability.

Banks began raising interest rates and pulling back credit lines about a year ago as delinquencies crept upward and regulators discussed reforms. As banks have become more aggressive in making changes, lawmakers have accused them of trying to impose rate increases before many of the new rules take effect in February.

On Monday, the Federal Reserve provided new evidence of the banks’ actions. About 50 percent of the banks responding to the Fed’s survey said they were increasing interest rates and reducing credit lines on borrowers with good credit scores. About 40 percent said they were imposing higher fees. The banks also said they were demanding higher minimum credit scores and tightening other requirements.

A study by the Pew Charitable Trusts, released late last month, concluded that the 12 largest banks, issuing more than 80 percent of the credit cards, were continuing to use practices that the Fed concluded were “unfair or deceptive” and that in many instances had been outlawed by Congress.

In response to voter complaints, the House of Representatives voted last week to make the law effective immediately. The bill now goes to the Senate, where a vote has not been scheduled. The Senate Banking Committee chairman, Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, meanwhile, is pushing legislation that would freeze interest rates on existing credit card balances until the law takes effect.

Whatever the starting date, the law makes it much harder for banks to change interest rates on existing balances, and requires more time and notice before a new rate can go into effect.

In their defense, banking officials say they have no choice but to raise rates and limit credit. Because of the new rules and the prolonged economic malaise, they say it is now far riskier to issue credit cards than it was just a few years ago.

“We sell credit; we don’t sell sweaters,” said Kenneth J. Clayton, senior vice president for card policy at the American Bankers Association. “The only way to manage your return is through the price of the product or the availability.”

The nation’s largest banks are scrambling to figure out a new business model that fits within the new rules and current economic conditions. Those banks made handsome profits over the last decade by charging high interest rates and penalty fees to a small group of customers who routinely paid late or exceeded their balances.

Already, banks are shifting to a model in which a smaller pool of Americans will be eligible for credit cards, and customers with cards will probably pay more for the privilege through annual fees and higher interest.

Meanwhile, the banks are in the process of shedding customers considered too risky. That means tens of thousands of Americans will no longer be able to splurge on Nike gym shoes or flat-screen televisions unless, of course, they have enough cash to pay for them.

Still, even consumer advocates have said that the banks were too quick in the past to give out credit. “You know, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that if you keep borrowing and borrowing in order to consume now, eventually you crash and burn,” said Martin Eakes, chief executive for the Center for Responsible Lending. “That’s what we’re facing.”

In the 12 months that ended in September, the number of Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Discover card accounts in the United States fell by 72 million, according to David Robertson, publisher of The Nilson Report, an industry newsletter. There are 555 million accounts still in the marketplace, he said.

In roughly the same time period, banks lowered credit limits by 26 percent, to $3.4 trillion, from $4.6 trillion, according to an analysis of government data by Foresight Analytics.

Interest on credit card accounts, meanwhile, has increased to an average of 13.71 percent, up from 11.94 percent a year ago, according to federal records.

As to credit card charge-offs — industry lingo for uncollectible balances — the number tracks the unemployment rate and, therefore, is hovering at around 10 percent.

For the banks, this is uncharted territory. In the modern financing era, credit cards were long a profit center, producing tens of billions in annual profits with a default rate that hovered around 4 percent until the recession.

“We know we are going to lose a lot of money next year in cards, and it could be north of $1 billion in both the first quarter and the second quarter. And that number will probably only start coming down as you see unemployment and charge-offs come down,” Jamie Dimon, chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, said in an earnings call last month.

Banking officials said that because the new law limits their ability to reprice credit as a customer’s risk profile changes, they will instead have to price for future risk at the start, when a cardholder applies for a new card.

That means fewer applicants will be approved for new credit cards, and those who are accepted will increasingly be charged annual fees or variable interest rates, rather than fixed rates. Currently, about 20 percent of credit cards charge annual fees, a percentage that is rising, said Bill Hardekopf, chief executive of LowCards.com. Current cardholders, too, will be affected.

Asked to explain its rate increases, Citibank issued a statement saying the “actions are necessary given the losses across the industry from customers not paying back their loans and regulatory changes that eliminate repricing for that risk.”

Ms. Holaday Schumacher did not accept that explanation. She said she haggled with Citibank to try to get her mother’s bills forwarded to her house in Washington and, during the process, two bills were inadvertently paid late, resulting in the rate increase.

“How unbelievably unfair for an older person who might not understand what this is all about,” she said. Citibank declined to comment on the account.

Still, many of the nation’s banks are trying to repair their tarnished reputations with consumers.

American Express and Discover Financial, for instance, have vowed to stop charging fees when cardholders exceed their credit limits. JPMorgan has started a program that can help consumers categorize their spending and pay down their balances more quickly.

And Bank of America is promoting a line of consumer products so simple that the terms and conditions fit on one page. The BankAmericard Basic Visa, for instance, has no rewards and a single interest rate.

Andrew Rowe, Global Card Services strategy executive at Bank of America, said the new products represented a sea change in the bank’s attitude toward consumer products. Instead of benefiting from consumers who displayed risky behavior by penalizing them with fees, the bank is now trying to help them break those bad habits, he said.

“We succeed if our customers succeed,” he said. “That’s the paradigm shift.”

Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, for one, said he would welcome consumer products that were simpler and less risky. But, he added in an interview with the PBS documentary program “Frontline”: “It’s a bit of a late conversion. It would have been nice to happen earlier.”

Edmund L. Andrews contributed reporting.

Freeze credit card rates

Check those harmless looking letters from your credit card companies. They're raising rates to the 30% max before February's law takes effect., after taking the bailout money and paying themselves high bonuses... all "in the interest of continuing to provide you with credit" Even if your credit rating is excellent.

The Miami Herald editorial, October 29, 2009

When Congress passed the Credit Cardholders' Bill of Rights last May, we called it a long overdue response to the abuses of predatory credit-card issuers who have used every trick in the book to extract money from cardholders. As it turns out, we underestimated the greed and craftiness of the credit-card industry.

In a well-meaning effort to give issuers time to adjust their practices, Congress set a compliance deadline of next February. Instead of seeing the law as a clear signal that consumers are fed up with abusive practices, however, leading bank card issuers used the time to squeeze more money from the public.

Not only have they done next to nothing to stop practices deemed unfair by the new law, but some of the practices that hurt consumers the most have become more widespread.

According to a report issued Wednesday by the Pew Charitable Trusts, ``credit card interest rates rose an average of 20 percent in the first two quarters of 2009, even as banks' cost of lending declined.'' Every credit card offered online by leading bank card issuers was tied to rules and conditions that will be outlawed once the compliance date arrives, Pew said.

Among other things, nearly all of the bank cards allowed issuers to increase interest rates on outstanding balances and permitted issuers to apply payments in a way the Federal Reserve found likely to cause substantial financial injury to consumers.

Punitive charges

Although arbitrary rate changes will no longer be allowed once the law takes effect, the higher rates that consumers are being hit with before then will remain in place. Many consumers with good credit scores and a history of paying their bills on time are shocked to discover that they are on the receiving end of this sort of treatment. Instead of being rewarded for handling their finances sensibly, they are being treated like deadbeats and smacked with rates that were once deemed strictly punitive.

Damage to credit scores

Increased rates that reach 29.99 percent have been widely reported in the case of some Citibank customers, for example. It has also been reported that Bank of America and Citibank were introducing new fees on consumers who don't use their cards enough or don't carry minimum balances.

Spokesmen for the banking industry say consumers always have the option of refusing the higher rates,. But if they do, they run the risk of having their card revoked, either immediately or when the expiration date arrives. First of all, this is an inconvenience, especially for card users with a good record. Secondly, abandoning a credit card for any reason can have a negative effect on credit scores. For the consumer, it's a losing proposition either way.

The Pew Report recommends that the Federal Reserve, which is developing detailed rules for credit card issuers, ensure that there will be no unreasonable or disproportionate penalties in the future, including penalty rate increases.

Congress should go one step further to stop this last-minute effort to milk consumers before the remaining provisions of the law take effect by freezing rates as soon as possible, as Sen. Chris Dodd, the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, has proposed.

Given the traditional deference shown to the banking industry in the Senate, his proposal is unlikely to make headway unless consumers contact their representatives in Congress. It's their money that's at risk.

Bankers Vs. The People: Which Side Is The White House On?

By Dan Froomkin, Huffington Post, October 28, 2009

As the battle lines are drawn between the people and the bankers outside the ABA convention in Chicago, the question arises: Which side is the White House on, exactly?

Yes, the Obama administration is pushing to dramatically increase the regulation of consumer and other financial transactions that have run amok, but there is widespread concern from across the political spectrum that the White House is neither going far enough nor fighting hard enough. And time and again -- most notably with the ongoing $700 billion bailout -- Obama administration policies have put the interests of bankers and Wall Street ahead of those of impoverished families, unemployed workers or underwater homeowners.

One reason -- which has never been directly addressed by Obama -- may be that many of his chief financial advisers have pocketed extraordinary amount of money from banks and Wall Street, and presumably intend to do so again. They are part of the banker class, and their loyalties have been bought and paid for.

Back in April, when the White House released financial disclosure forms late one Friday, those few people paying attention learned just how stupendously beholden Obama's top economic adviser, Larry Summers, is to the financial industry that he is ostensibly trying to rein in.

Summers was paid $5.2 million for his part-time work for a massive hedge fund in 2008. He also took in more than $2.7 million in fees for speaking engagements at such places as Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs -- including one visit alone that netted him $135,000 from Goldman Sachs.

That's right: $135,000 for one visit on one day. You can't pocket that kind of money and not be, on some level, corrupted.

Similarly, deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs Michael Froman received $7.4 million from Citigroup between January 2008 and January 2009 -- including a year-end bonus of $2.25 million that he received just days before coming to work at the White House for a man who was at that very moment calling just such bonuses "shameful".

And earlier this month, Bloomberg's Robert Schmidt significantly added to our understanding of just how co-opted Obama's financial team is by examining the financial disclosure forms of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's closest aides.

The advisers include Gene Sperling, who last year took in $887,727 from Goldman Sachs and $158,000 for speeches mostly to financial companies, including the firm run by accused Ponzi scheme mastermind R. Allen Stanford.

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Another top aide, Lee Sachs, reported more than $3 million in salary and partnership income from Mariner Investment Group, a New York hedge fund.

Sachs, who joined Treasury in January, reported in February that he was still owed a 2008 bonus whose value was "not ascertainable." I wonder how that one turned out.

Also in Geithner's inner circle, according to Schmidt: "counselor Lewis Alexander, the former chief economist at Citigroup; Chief of Staff Mark Patterson, who was a lobbyist at Goldman Sachs, and Matthew Kabaker, a deputy assistant secretary who worked at private equity firm."

Alexander was paid $2.4 million in 2008 and the first few months of 2009 by Citigroup; Kabaker earned $5.8 million working on private equity deals at Blackstone in 2008 and 2009.

Patterson, Geithner's chief of staff, was a registered lobbyist for Goldman Sachs before joining the Obama campaign, and took in what seemed at first glance to be a relatively modest-by-Goldman-standards salary of $637,230 in 2008. But it turns out that was only for three months' work -- he left Goldman in early April.

All this money makes Obama's top financial advisors veritable poster boys for the Wall Street culture that the president in his speeches has publicly decried as a "house of cards" and a "Ponzi scheme" in which "a relatively few do spectacularly well while the middle class loses ground".

I'm not doubting the smarts of Obama's financial team -- but I do feel that the vast majority of people who take the kind of money we're talking about here can't help but be warped by it, and that in choosing to cash in, they essentially disqualified themselves from public service.

Unless they are willing to assertively act in ways that redeem themselves and show that their allegiances have not been purchased, they should step down and make way for people who see the people's side of things a little more clearly.

* * * * * * * * * * * *
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Why the White House and Congress won't break up the banks

There are plenty of good reasons to break up the behemoth banks -- just not good enough for Obama

By Robert Reich

Oct. 26, 2009

And now there are five -- five Wall Street behemoths, bigger than they were before the Great Meltdown, paying fatter salaries and bonuses to retain their so-called"talent," and raking in huge profits. The biggest difference between now and last October is these biggies didn't know then that they were too big to fail and the government would bail them out if they got into trouble. Now they do. And like a giant, gawking adolescent who's just discovered he can crash the Lexus convertible his rich dad gave him and the next morning have a new one waiting in his driveway courtesy of a dad who can't say no, the biggies will drive even faster now, taking even bigger risks.

What to do? Two ideas are floating around Washington, but only one is supported by the Treasury and the White House. Unfortunately, it's the wrong one.

The right idea is to break up the giant banks. I don't often agree with Alan Greenspan but he was right when he said last week that "[i]f they're too big to fail, they're too big." Greenspan noted that the government broke up Standard Oil in 1911, and what happened? "The individual parts became more valuable than the whole. Maybe that's what we need to do." (Historic footnote: Had Greenspan not supported in 1999 Congress's repeal of the Glass Stagall Act, which separated investment from commercial banking, we wouldn't be in the soup we're in to begin with.)

Former Fed Chair Paul Volcker, whose only problem is he's much too tall, last week told the New York Times he'd like to see the restoration of the Glass-Steagall Act provisions that would separate the financial giants' deposit-taking activities from their investment and trading businesses. If this separation went into effect, JPMorgan Chase would have to give up the trading operations acquired from Bear Stearns. Bank of America and Merrill Lynch would go back to being separate companies. And Goldman Sachs could no longer be a bank holding company.

But the Obama Administration doesn't agree with either Greenspan or Volcker. While it says it doesn't want another bank bailout, its solution to the "too big to fail" problem doesn't go nearly far enough. In fact, it doesn't really go anywhere. The Administration would wait until a giant bank was in danger of failing and then put it into a process akin to bankruptcy. The bank's assets would be sold off to pay its creditors, and its shareholders would likely walk off with nothing. The Treasury would determine when such a "resolution" process was needed, and appoint a receiver, such as the FDIC, to wind down the bank's operations.

There should be an orderly process for putting big failing banks out of business. But this isn't nearly enough. By the time a truly big bank gets into trouble -- one that poses a "systemic risk" to the entire economy -- it's too late. Other banks, competing like mad for the same talent and profits, will already have adopted many of the excessively-risky banks techniques. And the pending failure will already have rocked the entire financial sector.

Worse yet, the Administration's plan gives the big failing bank an escape hatch: The receiver might decide that the bank doesn't need to go out of business after all -- that all it needs is some government money to tide it over until the crisis passes. So the Treasury would also have the authority to provide the bank with financial assistance in the form of loans or guarantees. In other words, back to bailout. (Historical footnote: Summers and Geithner, along with Bob Rubin, while at Treasury in 1999, joined Greenspan in urging Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall. The four of them -- Greenspan, Summers, Rubin and Geithner also refused to regulate derivatives, and pushed Congress to stop the Commodity Futures Trading Corporation from doing so.)

Congress is cooking up a variation on the "resolution" idea that would give the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation authority to trigger and handle the winding-down of big banks in trouble, without Treasury involvement, and without an escape hatch.

Needless to say, Wall Street favors the Administration's approach -- which is why the Administration chose it to begin with. If I were less charitable I'd say Geithner and Summers continue to bend over bankwards to make Wall Street happy, and in doing so continue to risk the credibility of the President, as well as the long-term financial stability of the system.

Wall Street could live with the slightly less delectable variation that Congress is coming up with. But Congress won't go as far as to unleash the antitrust laws on the big banks or resurrect the Glass-Steagall Act. After all, the Street is a major benefactor of Congress and the Street's lobbyists and lackeys are all over Capitol Hill.

The Street obviously detests the notion that its behemoths should be broken up. That's why the idea isn't even on the table. But it should be. No important public interest is served by allowing giant banks to grow too big to fail. Winding them down after they get into trouble is no answer. By then the damage will already have been done.

Whether it's using the antitrust laws or enacting a new Glass-Steagall Act, the Wall Street giants should be split up -- and soon.

-- By Robert Reich

Goldman Can Spare You a Dime

By FRANK RICH, NY Times, October 17, 2009

AT the dawn of the progressive era early in the last century, muckrakers attacked the first billionaire, John D. Rockefeller, for creating capitalism’s most ruthless monster. “The Octopus” was their nickname for Standard Oil, the trust that controlled nearly 90 percent of American oil. But even in that primordial phase of the industrial era, Rockefeller was mindful of his public image and eager to counter it. “His great brainstorm,” writes his biographer, Ron Chernow, “was undoubtedly his decision to dispense shiny souvenir dimes to adults and nickels to children as he moved about.” Who could hate an octopus tossing glittering coins?

It was hard not to think of Rockefeller’s old P.R. playbook while watching Goldman Sachs’s behavior when the Dow hit 10,000 last week. As leader of the Wall Street pack, Goldman declared surging profits, keeping it on track to dispense a record $23 billion in bonuses for 2009. But most Americans know all too well that only the intervention of billions of dollars in taxpayer bailout money saved Goldman from the dire fate of its less well-connected competitors. The growing ranks of under-and-unemployed Americans, meanwhile, are waiting with increasing desperation for a recovery of their own.

Goldman is this century’s octopus — almost literally so. The most-quoted sentence in financial journalism this year, by Matt Taibbi of Rolling Stone, describes the company as a “great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money.” That’s why Goldman’s chief executive, Lloyd Blankfein, recycled Rockefeller’s stunt last week: The announcement of Goldman’s spectacular third-quarter earnings ($3.19 billion) was paired with the news that the company was donating $200 million to its own foundation, which promotes education. In Goldman dollars, that largess is roughly comparable to the nickels John D. handed out to children a century ago. At least those kids could spend the spare change on candy.

Teddy Roosevelt’s trust-busting crusade ultimately broke up Standard Oil. Though Goldman did outlast three of its four major rival firms during last fall’s meltdown, it is not a monopoly. And there is one other significant way that our 21st-century vampire squid differs from Rockefeller’s 20th-century octopus. Americans knew what oil was, and they understood how Standard Oil’s manipulations directly affected their pocketbooks. Even now many Americans don’t know what Goldman’s products are or how it makes its money. The less we know, the easier it is for reckless gambling to return to capitalism’s casino, and for Washington to look the other way as a new financial bubble inflates.

As Wall Street was celebrating last week, Congress was having a big week of its own, arousing itself to belatedly battle some of the corporate suspects that have helped drive America into its fiscal ditch. The big action was at the Senate Finance Committee, which finally produced a health care bill that, however gingerly, bids to reform industries that have feasted on the nation’s Rube Goldberg medical system. At least health care, like oil, is palpable, so we will be able to keep score of how reform fares — win, lose or draw. But the business of Wall Street, while also at center stage in a Congressional committee last week, is so esoteric that the public is understandably clueless as to what, if anything, the lawmakers were up to, if anyone even noticed at all.

The first stab at corrective legislation emerging from Barney Frank’s Financial Services Committee in the House is porous. While unregulated derivatives remain the biggest potential systemic threat to the world’s economy, Frank said that “the great majority” of businesses that use derivatives would not be covered under his committee’s much-amended bill. It’s also an open question whether the administration’s proposed consumer agency to protect Americans from mortgage and credit-card outrages will survive the banking lobby’s attempts to eviscerate it. As that bill stands now, more than 98 percent of America’s banks — mainly community banks, representing 20 percent of deposits — would be shielded from the new agency’s supervision.

If it’s too early to pronounce these embryonic efforts at financial reform a failure, it’s hard to muster great hope. As the economics commentator Jeff Madrick points out in The New York Review of Books, the American public is still owed “a clear account of the financial events of the last two years and of who, if anyone, is seriously to blame.” Without that, there will be neither the comprehensive policy framework nor the political will to change anything.

The only investigation in town is a bipartisan Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission created by Congress in May. It is still hiring staff. Its 10 members are dispersed throughout the country, and, according to a spokeswoman, have contemplated only a half-dozen public sessions over the next year. Such a panel, led by the former California state treasurer Phil Angelides, seems highly unlikely to match Congress’s Depression-era Pecora commission. That investigation was driven by a prosecutor whose relentless fact-finding riveted the country and gave birth to the Securities and Exchange Commission, among other New Deal reforms. Last week, we learned that the current S.E.C. has hired a former Goldman hand as the chief operating officer of its enforcement unit.

Even as we wait for Congress and its inquiry to produce results, the cultural toxins revealed by our economic crisis remain unaddressed by the leaders in the private and public sectors who might make a difference now. Blankfein may be giving $200 million to “education,” but Goldman is back to business as usual: making money by high-risk gambling, with all the advantages that the best connections, cheap loans from the Fed and high-speed trading algorithms can bring. As the Reuters columnist Rolfe Winkler wrote last week, “Main Street still owns much of the risk while Wall Street gets all of the profit.”

The idea of investing in the real economy — the one that might create jobs for Americans — remains outré in this culture. Credit to small businesses remains tight. The holy capitalist grail is still the speculative buying and selling of companies and the concoction of ever more esoteric financial “instruments.” The tragic tale of Simmons Bedding recently told in The Times is a role model. This successful 133-year-old manufacturing enterprise was flipped seven times in two decades by private equity firms. Investors made more than $750 million in profits even as the pile-up of debt pushed Simmons into bankruptcy, costing a quarter of its loyal workers their jobs so far.

Most leaders in America are against this kind of ethos in principle. Last month the president of Harvard, Drew Gilpin Faust, contributed a stirring essay to The Times regretting that educational institutions did not make stronger efforts to assert the fundamental values of pure intellectual inquiry while “the world indulged in a bubble of false prosperity and excessive materialism.” She rued the rise of business as the most popular undergraduate major, an implicit reference to the go-go atmosphere during the reign of her predecessor, Lawrence Summers, now President Obama’s chief economic adviser.

What went unsaid, of course, is that some of Harvard’s most prominent alumni of the pre-Faust era — Summers, Blankfein, Robert Rubin et al. — were major players during the last two bubbles. As coincidence would have it, the same edition of The Times that published Faust’s essay also included an article about how Harvard was scrounging for bucks by licensing a line of overpriced preppy clothing under the brand Harvard Yard. This sop to excessive materialism will be a scant recompense for the $11 billion Harvard’s endowment managers lost in their own bad gamble on interest-rate swaps.

Obama has also passed through Harvard. (Disclosure: so did I.) He too has consistently said all the right things about the “money culture” of “quick kills and bloated bonuses,” of “reckless behavior and unchecked excess.” But the air of entitlement that continues to waft from his administration sends another message.

In particular, the tone-deaf Treasury secretary, Timothy Geithner, never ceases to amaze. His daily calendars reveal that most of his contacts with the financial sector in the first seven months of 2009 were limited to the trinity of Goldman Sachs, Citigroup and JPMorgan. And last week Bloomberg News reported that his inner circle of “counselors” — key advisers who, conveniently enough, do not require Senate confirmation — are largely drawn from the same club. It’s hard to see how any public official can challenge a culture that he is marinating in, night and day.

Those Obama fans who are disappointed keep looking for explanations. Is he too impressed by the elite he met in Cambridge, too eager to split the difference between left and right, too willing to compromise? As he pursues legislation, why does he keep deferring to others — whether to his party’s Congressional leaders or the Congressional Budget Office or to this month’s acting president, Olympia Snowe? Why doesn’t he ever draw a line in the sand? “We know Obama has good values,” Jeff Madrick said to me last week, “but we don’t know if he has convictions.”

What we also know is that if Teddy Roosevelt palled around with John D. Rockefeller as today’s political class does with Wall Street’s titans and lobbyists, the tentacles of the original octopus would still be coiled tightly around America’s neck.