Think before surging

By Fareed Zakaria
Monday, October 26, 2009

Dick Cheney has accused Barack Obama of "dithering" over Afghanistan. If the president were to quickly invade a country on the basis of half-baked intelligence, would that demonstrate his courage and decisiveness to Cheney? In fact, it's not a bad idea for Obama to take his time, examine all options and watch how the post-election landscape in Afghanistan evolves.

The real question we should be asking about Afghanistan is: "Do we need a third surge?" The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in January 2008 was 26,607. Over the next six months, the total rose to 48,250. President Bush described this policy as "the quiet surge," and he made the standard arguments about the need for a counterinsurgency capacity -- the troops had to not only fight the Taliban but also protect the Afghan population, strengthen and train the Afghan army and police, and assist in development.

In January, 3,000 more troops, originally ordered by Bush, went to Afghanistan in the first days of the Obama presidency. In February, responding to a request from the commander in the field, Obama ordered an additional 17,000 troops into the country. Put another way, over the past 18 months, troop levels in Afghanistan have almost tripled. Sending an additional 40,000 troops would mean an over 300 percent increase in U.S. troops since 2008. (The total surge in Iraq was just over 20,000 troops.) It is not dithering to try to figure out why previous increases have not worked and why we think additional ones would.

In fact, focusing on the number of additional troops needed "misses the point entirely," says Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander Obama put in place this summer. "The key takeaway" from his now-famous assessment "is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way we think and operate." The quotes are from the third paragraph of his 66-page memo. These changes in strategy have just begun.

To understand how U.S. troops had been fighting in Afghanistan, consider the Battle of Wanat. On July 13, 2008, a large number of Taliban fighters surrounded an American base in that village, in the southeastern corner of Afghanistan. After a few hours of fierce fighting, nine American soldiers lay dead, the largest number killed in a single engagement in years. Former Post reporter and defense expert Tom Ricks points out that Wanat is in a mountainous region with few people, many of them hostile to outsiders. So, he asks, "Why are we putting our fist in a hornet's nest?"

McChrystal has since pulled U.S. forces out of Wanat. The Post's Greg Jaffe, reporting on the town a year later, concluded recently that "ceding territory to the Taliban is more effective than maintaining small, vulnerable bases in forbidding terrain. In the past several weeks, U.S. commanders, based about six miles outside the village, have detected growing friction between Wanat residents and the Taliban commanders responsible for last year's attack." So why not let the Taliban try to set up bases in these remote areas with prickly locals? NATO forces can then periodically disrupt the Taliban rather than the other way around. In these places, counter-terrorism -- now often associated with Vice President Biden -- could work well with the grain of Afghan society.

Advocates of a troop increase act as if counterinsurgency is applied physics. McChrystal's team, having done the mathematical calculations, has apparently arrived at the exact answer. There is no room for variation or middle courses, the argument goes. But the theory that "it's 40,000 troops or no counterinsurgency" is absurd. The best evidence is that senior military officers assured me at various points over the past year that with the latest increase in troops they finally had enough forces to do counterinsurgency.

The crucial judgments that have to be made involve what the troops will do and how much of Afghanistan to cover. One option is the idea Ricks recently suggested to me: "Why not do the Petraeus plan [counterinsurgency] for the major population centers and the Biden plan [counterterrorism] for the rest of the country?" Following that middle course might be the most practical solution; more forces could still be needed, as McChrystal suggests, or perhaps we can make do with the almost 100,000 coalition forces already there. Obama should carefully consider all the options before racing to demonstrate how tough he is.

Fareed Zakaria is editor of Newsweek International and the author of "The Post-American World." His e-mail address is comments@fareedzakaria.com.

The War as We Saw It

A note from Greetings via Dan Froomkin of www.WashingtonPost.com :

Two of the seven active duty officers who wrote a recent New York Times op-ed expressing opposition to the war were killed in Baghdad on Monday, reports Joe Strupp of Editor and Publisher.

Op-Ed Contributors

By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY
Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.

Published: August 19, 2007
Baghdad
Paul Hoppe

VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day.

(Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.

The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context.

They saw in us something useful for the moment.

Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere.

There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.

At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.

In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”

In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.

Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.

We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.

Define Victory

The American people are told that "we" are close to victory. Just allow the escalation to take effect. Why reporters have readily accepted the term "surge", I am not clear. But it does show a pattern of journalistic acquiescence - or at least a lack of curiosity. Give them something to write, and they will write it.

What would be journalistic would be to begin to ask questions, rather, to be a journalist and not a stenographer. The first question that has never been asked of the administration by the press is, "Define victory."

We've been given many reasons why we should stay in Iraq, and many more why we needed to go in the first place. We are well past the possibility of actual journalistic investigations into the over half a dozen reasons that the administration gave to U.S. citizens as to why it, and we, went to war with Iraq. Each reason was duly noted by the press as a reason. The public did what it was used to doing and accepted each "reported" reason.

Since the press was asleep for the first round of questions, perhaps they can begin to ask the next round. What does the administration consider victory?

We have been told 1) that we needed to quell the insurgency; 2) that elections needed to be held; 3) that "we would stand down when they stand up"; and most recently 4) so that Iraq would not become a haven for terrorists.

We found out that the insurgency was a civil war. Elections were held, and a government was elected that has closer relations with Iran. The Iraqi civilians now appear afraid of their own police. And Afghanistan remains the central war with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda; a war we are losing due to the lack of troops in that region. Bin Laden has found a safe haven in Pakistan, and remains there. And from Pakistan, he is launching a move to try to regain a foothold in Afghanistan. Afghanistanis are tired of being left in the lurch and the U.S. appears to be losing the hearts and minds of that nation.

The escalation is said to be working. However, the same people who questioned Cheney on his assertion that "we would be greeted as liberators" have noted some similarities between the escalation and the start of the invasion of Iraq. Insurgents, which reads either Iraqi Sunnis or Iraqi Shiites, have left Baghdad as more American troops move in, much as they did at the start of the war in 2003. Much like in 2003, they have moved into two surrounding provinces, where violence has apparently increased as violence in Baghdad has decreased. Ali called this his "rope-a-dope". I'd like to think we are smarter than George Foreman, although experience at least provided him with The George Foreman Grille and success in his later years.

Again, I come back to one question I would like the press to ask Bush and Cheney - repeatedly. "Define victory." In World War II, the definition of victory was clear. The defeat of Germany and Japan, at whatever cost it took from our citizenry and whatever it cost those countries in terms of civilian lives, as well. The fire bombing of Tokyo devastated Japan. Dresden Hiroshima, Nagasaki,- were all calculated to defeat not only the armed forces of those countries, but the wills of their citizens. After all, they had invaded us. And complete victory was our only option. Whatever it took to defeat those countries and their allies. Is that something we really want to do to the Iraqi people?

In Vietnam, victory was not well defined, and it was not achieved. We wanted to stabilize Vietnam so that other countries would not tumble as Communist dominoes. What was stabilization? What was victory? We wanted "to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people", which we finally found were one against us. We now do most of our manufacturing in Vietnam, but we did not win that war, and we did not "define victory" in that war. China did not follow us home.

We were, and are, told that Iraq was involved in 9/11 - it was not. It was tied in with Bin Laden - it was not. And that it had weapons of mass destruction - it did not. And finally, that we would be welcomed as liberators. Many citizens and knowledgeable people questioned those facts, but many in the press and government did not. They wrote them down and passed them on to the public.

When we reached Baghdad, President Bush stood on the deck of the aircraft carrier and declared victory. Apparently not. So again... "Define victory."

For, while fighting terrorism has a more vague definition of victory, defeating a country does not. But are we prepared to do what it takes to defeat a country like Iraq and "define victory" as the defeat of that country, much as we did with Germany and Japan in World War II? In those cases it was much easier to install a government that we thought would be one that would act honorably in later years. And the governments of those countries have done just that. They have become allies, at least under previous administrations.

It becomes more clear that invading Iraq was meant by Bush and his neo-cons as a way to show our strength. They had premised the invasion of Iraq before Bush even took office in their documents under People for the New American Century. They felt it would be an easy win for Bush to unite the country behind him and the Republican Party. Pursuing Bin Laden and fighting terrorism is more difficult and more subtle.

So did invading Iraq get us closer to finding and defeating Bin Laden and the Taliban? It appears they are regrouping as I write this. Again, "Define Victory" - at least in Iraq. And journalists, please regain your wits and ask that question.

Then we can get on to pursuing the terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan, before they grow stronger. We can describe to the American public how we intend to fight and defeat terrorism, so that Americans again trust our leaders and unite behind them to fight the terrorists.Then we will know where to send our soldiers and why - or if we should send them or prescribe a different course of action. Then we can quit making our soldiers sit in a shooting gallery with no apparent goal in mind, other than "to fight there so 'they' don't follow us here'." We can stop saying that being in Iraq is the definition of victory.

Then we will know not when, but HOW our brave men and women in Iraq who have fought so valiantly can come home. Without a definition of victory, how can we win?