Bankers Without a Clue

Well, if you were hoping for a Perry Mason moment — a scene in which the witness blurts out: “Yes! I admit it! I did it! And I’m glad!” — the hearing was disappointing. What you got, instead, was witnesses blurting out: “Yes! I admit it! I’m clueless!”

By PAUL KRUGMAN

Published: January 14, 2010

The official Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission — the group that aims to hold a modern version of the Pecora hearings of the 1930s, whose investigations set the stage for New Deal bank regulation — began taking testimony on Wednesday. In its first panel, the commission grilled four major financial-industry honchos. What did we learn?

Well, if you were hoping for a Perry Mason moment — a scene in which the witness blurts out: “Yes! I admit it! I did it! And I’m glad!” — the hearing was disappointing. What you got, instead, was witnesses blurting out: “Yes! I admit it! I’m clueless!”

O.K., not in so many words. But the bankers’ testimony showed a stunning failure, even now, to grasp the nature and extent of the current crisis. And that’s important: It tells us that as Congress and the administration try to reform the financial system, they should ignore advice coming from the supposed wise men of Wall Street, who have no wisdom to offer.

Consider what has happened so far: The U.S. economy is still grappling with the consequences of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression; trillions of dollars of potential income have been lost; the lives of millions have been damaged, in some cases irreparably, by mass unemployment; millions more have seen their savings wiped out; hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, will lose essential health care because of the combination of job losses and draconian cutbacks by cash-strapped state governments.

And this disaster was entirely self-inflicted. This isn’t like the stagflation of the 1970s, which had a lot to do with soaring oil prices, which were, in turn, the result of political instability in the Middle East. This time we’re in trouble entirely thanks to the dysfunctional nature of our own financial system. Everyone understands this — everyone, it seems, except the financiers themselves.

There were two moments in Wednesday’s hearing that stood out. One was when Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase declared that a financial crisis is something that “happens every five to seven years. We shouldn’t be surprised.” In short, stuff happens, and that’s just part of life.

But the truth is that the United States managed to avoid major financial crises for half a century after the Pecora hearings were held and Congress enacted major banking reforms. It was only after we forgot those lessons, and dismantled effective regulation, that our financial system went back to being dangerously unstable.

As an aside, it was also startling to hear Mr. Dimon admit that his bank never even considered the possibility of a large decline in home prices, despite widespread warnings that we were in the midst of a monstrous housing bubble.

Still, Mr. Dimon’s cluelessness paled beside that of Goldman Sachs’s Lloyd Blankfein, who compared the financial crisis to a hurricane nobody could have predicted. Phil Angelides, the commission’s chairman, was not amused: The financial crisis, he declared, wasn’t an act of God; it resulted from “acts of men and women.”

Was Mr. Blankfein just inarticulate? No. He used the same metaphor in his prepared testimony in which he urged Congress not to push too hard for financial reform: “We should resist a response ... that is solely designed around protecting us from the 100-year storm.” So this giant financial crisis was just a rare accident, a freak of nature, and we shouldn’t overreact.

But there was nothing accidental about the crisis. From the late 1970s on, the American financial system, freed by deregulation and a political climate in which greed was presumed to be good, spun ever further out of control. There were ever-greater rewards — bonuses beyond the dreams of avarice — for bankers who could generate big short-term profits. And the way to raise those profits was to pile up ever more debt, both by pushing loans on the public and by taking on ever-higher leverage within the financial industry.

Sooner or later, this runaway system was bound to crash. And if we don’t make fundamental changes, it will happen all over again.

Do the bankers really not understand what happened, or are they just talking their self-interest? No matter. As I said, the important thing looking forward is to stop listening to financiers about financial reform.

Wall Street executives will tell you that the financial-reform bill the House passed last month would cripple the economy with overregulation (it’s actually quite mild). They’ll insist that the tax on bank debt just proposed by the Obama administration is a crude concession to foolish populism. They’ll warn that action to tax or otherwise rein in financial-industry compensation is destructive and unjustified.

But what do they know? The answer, as far as I can tell, is: not much.

The Show Must Not Go On

Asking those responsible why it happened won't get answers. Only the retrieval of documents and other true investigative procedures will. I hope these folks have those skills.

New York Times Editorial, Jan. 17, 2010

Political theater and public scolding are good ways to draw attention to important issues and bad behavior, and Phil Angelides, chairman of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, made use of both last week. As he swore in four of the nation’s top bankers, it was impossible not to think of that famous scene with executives from the tobacco industry. During the questioning, he rebuked Lloyd Blankfein, head of Goldman Sachs, for his firm’s practice of selling mortgage-related securities and at the same time betting they would fall in value.

Now that he has everyone’s attention, Mr. Angelides and his fellow commissioners can get to the hard part.

Inconclusive sparring at hearings will not fulfill the mandate Congress gave the panel to investigate the causes of the crisis. Indeed, the bankers who testified last week did not say much they had not said before.

The commission must uncover what bankers, investors, government officials and other people in positions of power, past and present, would prefer not to say — or perhaps do not know or understand — about the crash and the bailouts. The primary aim is not to air issues and foster debate, but to test views, resolve contradictions and arrive at evidence-based conclusions.

Yet the commission — which is supposed to file a final report by Dec. 15 — has not issued a single subpoena for documents. Instead, investigators have apparently been relying on voluntary cooperation, public records and information-sharing agreements that have been negotiated with federal agencies. A thorough investigation requires source documents that reveal what people were thinking and doing at the time of the events and that illuminate, buttress or contradict testimony.

Take, for example, Mr. Blankfein’s explanation that the clients Goldman bet against were sophisticated investors who demanded the doomed securities that Goldman sold them. Apart from the fact that the notion of “sophisticated investors” has been discredited by the crisis, does that explanation go far enough?

Without peering into the internal workings of Goldman and other financial firms that engaged in similar practices, it is hard to know how far bankers went in creating demand rather than responding to it, or if the securities were purposely designed to perform poorly.

The answers could cast light on when Wall Street practices cross the line from prudent hedging to excessive speculation.

A crucial related issue is whether Wall Street’s role as the underwriter of securities, which implies a level of approval of the investments being offered for sale, misled investors into buying questionable securities, and thus contributed to the credit bubble. If so, that would make the argument for barring too-big-to-fail banks from operating hedge funds all the more compelling.

Given the stakes, the chances seem remote that Wall Street will voluntarily hand over the papers that could get to the bottom of it all.

The inquiry is getting under way at a critical moment. The House has passed a financial regulatory reform bill that was enfeebled in important respects by bank lobbyists. The Senate banking committee recently rejected a generally robust proposal by Senator Christopher Dodd. It has yet to produce an alternative, but it is likely that lobbying and partisan politics will generate a weak bill. President Obama’s call for a new tax on big banks is a good idea, but must not pre-empt other needed changes, including a tax on bankers’ bonuses and more direct regulation to limit the size of financial firms.

Serious investigative work is the only way to counter the banks’ political power and alter the course of a reform effort that is headed in the wrong direction.