Buddhists stole my clarinet... and I'm still as mad as Hell about it! How did a small-town boy from the Midwest come to such an end? And what's he doing in Rhode Island by way of Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York? Well, first of all, it's not the end YET! Come back regularly to find out. (Plant your "flag" at the bottom of the page, and leave a comment. Claim a piece of Rhode Island!) My final epitaph? "I've calmed down now."

Tuesday, November 24, 2009

The Wages of Failure:

Note from greetings: A great analysis of from Harvard's Law School on how the Bear Sterns and Lehman Bros. Execs ransacked the bailout money for their own benefit

Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008

Lucian A. Bebchuk,Alma Cohen,** and Holger Spamann***

Abstract

The standard narrative of the meltdown of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers assumes that the wealth of the top executives of these firms was largely wiped out along with their firms. In the ongoing debate about regulatory responses to the financial crisis, commentators have used this assumed fact as a basis for dismissing both the role of compensation structures in inducing risk-taking and the potential value of reforming such structures. This paper provides a case study of compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman during 2000-2008 and concludes that this assumed fact is incorrect.

We find that the top-five executive teams of these firms cashed out large amounts of performance-based compensation during the 2000-2008 period. During this period, they were able to cash out large amounts of bonus compensation that was not clawed back when the firms collapsed, as well as to pocket large amounts from selling shares. Overall, we estimate that the top executive teams of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers derived cash flows of about $1.4 billion and $1 billion respectively from cash bonuses and equity sales during 2000-2008. These cash flows substantially exceeded the value of the executives’ initial holdings in the beginning of the period, and the executives’ net payoffs for the period were thus decidedly positive. The divergence between how the top executives and their shareholders fared implies that it is not possible to rule out, as standard narratives suggest, that the executives’ pay arrangements provided them with excessive risk-taking incentives. We discuss the implications of our analysis for understanding the possible role that pay arrangements have played in the run-up to the financial crisis and how they should be reformed going forward.

http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/BCS-Wages-of-Failure-Nov09.pdf for the entire paper

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